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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
LAURENCE W. KNOWLES*
I. STATICS AND STATISTICS
The South has many faces, and as many attitudes toward school
desegregation. In the heart of Dixie a federal district court judge
calls the Supreme Court's decision in the School Segregation Cases,'
"one of the truly regrettable decisions of all times."'  But further
south by the compass, a school board in Dade County, Florida
adopts nondiscriminatory school personnel practices, stating "we do
not believe we can teach democracy in our schools without demon-
strating our belief in democracy in the way the schools are op-
erated." 3  In 1963, a board of education in Oklahoma City, Okla-
homa, is discovered practicing discrimination, southern style.4
And Prince Edward County, Virginia, begins its fifth September
without public schools.5
In short, any discussion of southern school desegregation must
be self-defining. What distinguishes segregation southern style
from segregation in other parts of the country? It is not a
geographical distinction, anymore than Baltimore and Cambridge,
Maryland, can be linked together as southern or northern in tempera-
ment. Painted with a broadbrush, southern school segregation is
segregation motivated by racial factors, whereas school segregation
in the North and West is resulting from the use of geographical
school attendance areas in Negro ghettoes. More simply, the South
keeps its Negroes out of the neighborhood schools, and the North
keeps its Negroes in the neighborhood schools. Both practices
result in educational apartheid.'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 214 F. Supp. 624, 625
(E.D. La. 1963).
S iami Herald, June 6, 1963, § C, p. 3.
'Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
The Prince Edward County case, one of the original school desegrega-
tion cases, is still in litigation. The latest decision, by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, put off a final decision to still another day. The court
decided to await a Virginia state court decision interpreting the constitu-
tionality of the closing of public schools in the county. Griffen v. Board of
Supervisors, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2101 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1963).
" These practices are by no means the only practices which foster mono-
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The Supreme Court has held school assignment practices based
on race which result in segregation unconstitutional.7 The Court
did this on May 17, 1954. On May 17, 1963, the ninth anniversary
of that decision, no Negro child attended public school with white
children in the states of Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina.!
In Georgia, only 44 Negro pupils attended formerly all white
schools.' Louisiana, North Carolina, and Arkansas had placed
less than 1000 of their Negro scholastics in desegregated schools.10
Indeed, nearly a decade had passed and none of the former Con-
federate States1 had desegregated more than 3 per cent of their
Negro school population. The border states'" and the District of
Columbia had moved considerably further.'3 But nevertheless, the
close of the 1962-1963 school year found less than 8 per cent of the
Negro school population in desegregated schools in the 17 southern
and border states and the District of Columbia. 4
racial groupings. One study revealed that Negro students, because of their
more culturally deprived environs, tended to gravitate to the lower achieving
groups or tracts. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT, CIVIL
RIGHTS U.S.A.: PuBLIc ScHooLs SOUTHERN STATES 1962, at 37 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as SOUTHERN STATES]; cf. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham
County Bd. of Educ., 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 514 (S.D. Ga. June 28, 1963),
injunction granted pending appeal, 318 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963).
'The Court has yet to rule on: (1) School assignments based on race
which result in desegregation. For example, the school board of Teaneck,
New Jersey, allows transfers in or out of a predominantly Negro elementary
school only if the transfers promote racial balance in the school. Minutes
of Teaneck Board of Education meeting of May 8, 1963. (2) School assign-
ments not based on race which result in segregation. For example, most
northern school assignment practices are based on the neighborhood school
theory. Consequently, when Negro children in a Negro residential area are
required to attend a school located in that area, the school becomes virtually
all-Negro. A federal court has ruled that this so-called de facto segregation
is not unconstitutional. Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D.
Ind. 1963).
' Southern School News, June, 1963, p. 1, cols. 1-3.
'Ibid. Atlanta was the only city desegregated. As regards whether the
Atlanta desegregation process can be expected to quicken, see Calhoun v.
Latimer, 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 502 (5th Cir. June 17, 1963).
1" Southern School News, June, 1963, p. 1, cols. 1-3.
"Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
1 Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Vir-
ginia.
18 Oklahoma has the lowest percentage of Negroes attending school with
white children, 23.6 per cent. Southern School News, June, 1963, p. 1, cols.
1-3. However, this is 20 plus per cent higher than the closest southern state,
Texas. Ibid.
1" Ibid.
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II. THE STATUS QUO IN FORMALDEHYDE
Before the Brown decision southern children were assigned to
schools according to race and residence. Large cities in the South
used two school attendance zone maps-one map distributed white
children among the white schools and the second map distributed the
Negro school population among the Negro schools. Often the white
and Negro schools adjoined one another. In the smaller communi-
ties, one consolidated school served all the Negro children and one
consolidated school served all the white children. Consequently dual
attendance area maps were unnecessary.
The Brown decision signaled the end of express segregative prac-
tices in southern schools. Although between 1954 and 1957 official
segregation enjoyed an indian summer characterized by massive
resistance legislation, the unwelcome, but unmistakable, handwriting
was on the wall. Official policies could no longer expressly consider
race a factor in pupil assignment. The issue was clear; southern
legislatures had to retain segregated schools, but at the same time
purge their school laws of any mention of race. As a solution the
legislatures came up with the pupil assignment laws.
The pupil assignment acts, adopted by all the former Confederate
States,'5 provide that each child individually shall be assigned to a
specific school. Either state or local officials are given the power of
assignment, 'and they are charged with the duty to consider a num-
ber of criteria in assigning a pupil, including available school build-
ings, faculties, and transportation; the academic training and abili-
ties of the child as suited to a particular school; the child's personal
characteristics, health, morals, and home environment; and the
effect the admission of the particular pupil would have on other
pupils in a specific school and the community.' 6 If parents object
to the assignment of their child, they must follow an intricate scheme
of hearings and appeals, with no guarantee that the assignment will
be changed. Similarly, if a child wants to transfer from one school
152 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT, EDUCATION 1961, at 22
(1961).
1 The Supreme Court held that at least one of these criteria is a valid
school assignment measure. However, it did not hold that all are valid.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
" For a run-around that would make Quintus Fabius Maximus look like
an amateur, see Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962).
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to another, he and his parents must pursue still another set of
procedures.'
Behind the facade of the pupil assignment acts, southern school
systems continued to assign Negroes to traditionally Negro schools
and white children to traditionally white schools. In fact, few
communities made any pretense at good faith administration of the
new school assignment laws.
As would be expected, the assignment acts were soon in the
federal courts. In Carson v. Warlick,0 the first significant de-
cision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals handed the proponents
of the placement laws exactly what they had hoped for. The court
held that Negro parents objecting to school assignments could not
sue without first following the labyrinthine rehearing and appeal
structures provided in the pupil assignment laws. Moreover the
court held that the individual plaintiffs could not sue to desegregate
the whole school system. They could secure only their own ad-
mission. This, in effect, meant that every Negro school child dis-
criminated against by the same school system had to individually:
(1) wade through a morass of administrative red tape to "exhaust
his state remedies"; and (2) then bring suit only for himself.20
Several years elapsed before the pupil assignment laws were
again before a federal court of appeals; and it was then that the
whittling at Carson v. Warlick began. In October, 1959, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals (although expressly approving Carson)
18 An artful use of the transfer provisions of the Virginia pupil place-
ment act is described by Professor Mearns of the University of Virginia
as follows:
"Negroes seeking admission (transfer) to the lowest elementary grade
of white schools face another obstacle. The State cutoff date, after which
requests for transfer will not be considered, falls prior to the date of pre-
registration which is set by the local [Richmond] officials. Unless a Negro
parent is particularly foresighted, he will not have thought to apply for
transfer before his child's enrollment in school. The result is that most
Negro children begin their education in a Negro school. Therefore, the first
real opportunity for a Negro child to apply for admission to a white school
comes toward the end of his first school year. But once a pupil is settled
in a school, inertia cuts down his desire to transfer. Thus, the time sequence
on transfer reduces the number of Negroes who seek to attend desegregated
schools in Richmond." SOUTHERN STATES 187.19238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
" Actually all parties who had exhausted their administrative remedies
could join together as a class in a single suit, but they still could not represent
the children who had not exhausted their state administrative remedies.
See Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
840 (1959).
[Vol. 42
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did not dismiss the suit of Negro plaintiffs who had failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies under the Arkansas Pupil Placement
Act.2 ' The very next month the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
flatly rejected the Florida Pupil Placement Act.22 Two years later,
in March, 1962, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the Tennes-
see Pupil Placement Act as used by Memphis school authorities un-
constitutional.2"
By June, 1962 it was clear that the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals felt the backwash of the criticisms of Carson v. Warlick.
For at that time the court began the tortuous backdown from its
1956 decision. In five cases, 4 decided between May and December,
1962, the court was able to bring itself in line with the other federal
courts in the South. As 1963 opened, the federal courts presented a
solid front against the southern pupil placement acts.25 Negro
plaintiffs could ignore the administrative red tape of school transfer
regulations, and go immediately to the federal courts. Moreover,
one plaintiff could represent all of the Negro children in a school
system, saving each of them the trouble and expense of suit.
III. FROM THE COURTS TO THE SCHOOLS
Current desegregation doctrine assures segregated Negro chil-
dren in the South an easy entrance into the federal courts. In this
sense, half the battle has been carried. In another sense the battle
has just begun, for it is still a long step from the court house to the
school house in contemporary desegregation dogma.
Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959).
22 Gibson v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 272 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1959).
SNorthcross v. Board of Educ., 302 F2d 818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 944 (1962).2 Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 309 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1962);
Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962); Dillard v. School Bd., 308
F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962); Marsh v. County School Bd., 305 F.2d 94 (4th
Cir. 1962) ; Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962).
2 There still remained some mopping up exercises over the federal dis-
trict courts. Even as late as 1963 a few lower courts were still insisting that
the pupil placement laws were proper desegregative vehicles.
In Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425 (5th
Cir. 1963), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals framed its own desegregation
order for a lower court which had held that the Supreme Court was wrong
in 1954 and that school segregation was constitutional. See also Armstrong
v. Board of Educ., 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 465 (5th Cir. July 12, 1963). But
see Corbin v. County School Bd., Civil No. 2737, E.D. Va., May 16, 1963;
Evers v. Jackson, Civil No. -, S.D. Miss., June 25, 1963; Hudson v. Leake
County School Bd., Civil No. -, S.D. Miss., June 25, 1963.
1963]
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The role of the federal courts in the school desegregation process
was broadly defined by the Supreme Court in 1955.2' In general,
the courts were to require local school authorities to make a prompt
and reasonable start toward desegregation. After a start had been
made, the federal courts could allow school authorities additional
time to solve the various administrative problems involved in the
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. Guided
only by this blurred blueprint, the federal courts set about the work
of reorganizing the school structures and policies of a third of the
United States. After several years of trial and error, the courts
arrived at an acceptable time schedule. It was a twelve year stairstep
process, with the desegregation of one grade-per-year throughout
the school system."
The grade-a-year time schedule held up as an acceptable de-
segregation pace until 1961.2 Then the courts took a closer look
at still-segregated school systems. Several facts forced this re-
examination: (1) six years had passed since the Brown decision;
(2) most southern school systems had made no pretension of ini-
tiating desegregation; and (3) even when brought to court, school
authorities often remained intransigent.2" The question was then
2' Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
27 Calhoun v. Latimer, 188 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Calhoun v.
Members of Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1959); Kelley v.
Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959).
If a grade-a-year plan started at grade twelve and worked down, it would
allow every Negro child in the system an opportunity, albeit limited, for some
desegregated education. On the other hand, if a grade-a-year plan started
with the first grade, no Negro child in grades two through twelve would ever
experience a desegregated education. For articulate indifference to the latter
phenomenon try:
"Some individuals, parties to this case, will not themselves benefit from the
transition. At a turning point in history some, by the accidents of fate, move
on to the new order. Others, by the same fate, may not. If the transition
is made successfully, these plaintiffs will have had a part. Moses saw the
land of Judah from Mount Pisgah, though he himself was never to set foot
there." Goss v. Board of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 559, 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1960),
aff'd, 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 373 U.S. 683
(1963).
" As late as 1962, federal courts in Texas were accepting a grade-a-year
plan if the Negro plaintiffs did not object. Eastland v. Northeast Houston
Independent School Dist., Civil No. 13,330, S.D. Tex., Oct. 23, 1962; Wash-
ington A. & M. Independent Consol. School Dist., Civil No. 13,816, S.D.
Tex., Aug. 17, 1962. As regards the changing judicial attitude in 1963, see
Liase v. Longview Independent School Dist., Civil No. -, E.D. Tex., June
27, 1963.
2" Goss v. Board of Educ., 301 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
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clearly presented: Should federal courts continue to extend a twelve
year desegregation tolerance to school authorities who for six years
had refused to recognize the rights of their Negro children? The
answer was no.30 The equities had shifted,3 ' and the federal judges
began to shorten the time schedules of desegregation.32
Twelve-year desegregation plans now belong to desegregation's
history. September, 1963, saw grade-a-year plans begin in only a
few Deep South communities. 3 In systems outside the Deep South
grade-a-year plans are no longer appropriate, 4 and in the border
states, federal judges tolerate nothing except immediate, systemwide
desegregation. 5
IV. FRom How LoNG TO How
In the formative years of desegregation doctrine the battle lines
were drawn around the issue of how long a school district could
postpone desegregation. This issue is quickly receding to the back-
ground of desegregation litigation. The prime issue today is: What
" Jackson v. School Board, Civil No. 8722, 4th Cir., June 29, 1963; Bush
v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 308 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1962); Goss v. Board
of Educ., supra note 29. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
considering the Delaware desegregation process, had deemed twelve years
too long as early as 1960. Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir.), applica-
tion for stay denied, 364 U.S. 802 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961).
1 In the Supreme Court's original instructions to the district courts in
1955, the Court stressed the equitable nature of the balanced interests stating:
"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
"2 The Supreme Court, in dictum, endorsed the acceleration of school
desegregation:
"Given the extended time which has elapsed, it is far from clear that
the mandate of the second Brown decision requiring that desegregation
proceed with 'all deliberate speed' would today be fully satisfied by types
of plans or programs for desegregation of public educational facilities which
eight years ago might have been deemed sufficient. Brown never contem-
plated that the concept of 'deliberate speed' would countenance indefinite delay
in elimination of racial barriers in schools.... ." Watson v. City of Memphis,
373 U.S. 526, 530 (1963).3
'E.g., Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 465 (5th
Cir., July 12, 1963); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 318 F.2d 63 (5th
Cir. 1963); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425
(5th Cir. 1963).
", Cases cited note 30 supra.
"
3E.g., Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963);
Walker v. Richmond, Ky., Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 241, E.D. Ky., June 14,
1963; Davis v. Board of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
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does desegregation mean? Does it simply mean purging formal
and informal school policies of any mention of race ?3  Does it mean
that all Negro children must be placed in schools with white chil-
dren ?37  Or does it mean that all Negro children must have an
opportunity (whether or not exercised) to attend school with white
children?" Does it mean that all vestiges of the pre-Brown system
of segregation, e.g., schools built in the center of the Negro com-
munities, and staffed with all Negro faculties, must be abandoned?
The Supreme Court has yet to answer these questions."0 More-
over, many federal judges in the South have not had to face the issue
of what is desegregation in the constitutional sense. This is owing
to the fact that southern systems were operated on totally white and
black bases. Consequently, any desegregation schemes suggested
by southern school officials were almost certain to result in some
school integration, a step in the constitutional direction. Again,
because in the late 1950's the time quotient for full compliance was
usually twelve years, the courts could justifiably postpone the issue
of full compliance for at least a decade.
Conversely, although federal courts in the South have yet to
define what is desegregation in the constitutional sense, these courts
have suppLed some guide-lines on the problem.4" These guide-lines
inhere in the changing judicial attitudes towards current desegrega-
tion plans and policies. Almost a decade of trial-and-error with the
difficulties of school integration has given federal courts experiences
and perspectives of the desegregation process they lacked in the be-
ginning. These experiences and perspectives are reflected in the
" Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) held that classifications
based on race for purposes of transfers between public schools violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
"' In Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C.), enforcing sub. noa.,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the court stated: "Nothing
in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away
from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution,
in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimina-
tion." Id. at 777.
" This is the nature of the decree in Taylor v. Board of Educ., 195 F.
Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
940 (1961).
" The Court in Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963), ex-
pressed an increasing disapproval of the slow pace of desegregation, but did
not comment on the issue of total desegregation.
"0 In the North this issue has been squarely faced in Bell v. School City
of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
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current judicial treatment of desegregation schemes as proposed by
school authorities who are to begin integration of their systems.
There are two major types of desegregation plans: a free-choice-
of-schools plan, and a geographical zoning plan.
A. The Free-Choice-of-Schools Plan; Urban Ar'eas in the South
The free-choice-of-schools scheme of school integration was pop-
ularized by Baltimore, Maryland 4' and Louisville, Kentucky.4" The
plan simply allows any child in the system to choose any school he
wishes to attend. A variant on the same concept is the Houston,
Texas plan which allows any, child in the system a choice of two spe-
cific schools in his neighborhood, the formerly all-Negro school or the
formerly all-white school.43 In smaller school systems which have
adopted this plan, there are often only two schools, the traditional
Negro school and the traditional white school.44 In these systems
also the free-choice-of-schools policy is limited to only two schools.
Do free-choice-of-schools plans actually integrate school systems?
Conceptually, the plans, allow every Negro child an opportunity to
receive a biracial education.45 But between the idea and the reality
there falls the shadow.46 In the large school systems of Louisville
and Baltimore, Negro children living in large Negro residential
areas must spend money and time to reach a biracial school; the
systems do not furnish bus transportation. Moreover, the Negro
"See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 17-18.
'2 See CARMICHAEL & JAmES, THE LouIsvILLE STORY (1957).
,8 Ross v. Peterson, 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 709 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 1960).
"Vick v. County Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tenn. 1962).
Except, of course, when the free-choice-of-schools is limited to one
grade a year. The children in the still-to-be-desegregated grades must attend
according to their race. But see Dove v. Parham, 7 RAcE IZL. L. REP. 1047(E.D. Ark. Oct. 25, 1962).
Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow
For thine is the Kingdom
Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the Shadow
Life is very long
ELLIOT, The Hollow Men, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1935, at 104 (1936).
"" New York City assumes the costs of transportation of children seeking
to escape schools with a minority group enrollment of 88% or more.
1963]
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parents find it difficult to participate in social and educational
programs in the biracial schools located far from their homes.""
On the other hand, rarely will a white child, or his parents,
choose the pre-desegregation Negro school. No court can change the
community's image of these schools to anything but the "colored
schools," or "the Negro high school." Moreover, the names of
many of the pre-Brown Negro high schools are easily identifiable
as such. A white graduate of a school named Crispus Attucks,
Rosenwald, or Booker T. Washington, is surely identifiable as a
graduate of a Negro school in communities both North and South.
Consequently, free-choice-of-school policies in the larger cities in
the South,49 or in Louisville" and Baltimore,5 as cities with a
southern exposure, have not brought about biracial school systems;
but systems of all-white, 2 biracial, and all-Negro schools.
In large southern cities, a free-choice-of-schools-plan may or
may not conform to the concept of full compliance to the Brown
decisions. Whether it does in small southern communities is a
totally different question, attended by quite different considerations.
B. The Free-Choice-of-Schools Plan; Rural Areas in the South.
The Negro parent in small southern school districts is gen-
erally economically dependent upon the white business man or
farmer. Moreover, he and his job are known by more people in
the community than his city counterpart, who enjoys urban anonym-
ity. Consequently, the easily identifiable Negro parent who enrolls
his child in a white school in a rural school district risks economic,
social, and other pressures not risked by his urban neighbors. 8 Even
' In St. Louis, when Negro children were bused to distant schools to
relieve overcrowding in neighborhood schools, the parents were still con-
sidered part of the neighborhood school P.T.A. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT, CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A.: PUBLIC ScHooLs NORTH AND
WEST 1962, at 270-74 (1962).
" See Calhoun v. Latimer, & RAcE RE. L. RE,. 502 (5th Cir. June 17,
1963), for the modified free choice plan in effect in Atlanta, Ga. In three
years of operation the plan had succeeded in placing 53 of its 46,000 Negro
school children in formerly all-white schools. When the plan was attacked
as moving too slowly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the plan
as consonant with constitutional speed.50 SOUTHERN STATES 26-38.
" See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 17.
" See authorities cited notes 50-51 supra.
" In some instances the local newspapers will publish information on
Negro transfer applicants, including the names and addresses of the Negro
parents, and their place of employment. So much for free speech and the
fourth estate.
[Vol. 42
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if these threats do not in fact materialize, many a Negro parent will
not want to take the chance that they will.54
One court, when considering a proposed free-choice plan, recog-
nized that the Negro parents in the school district occupied an eco-
nomically subservient position in the community.55 Nevertheless
the court approved the plan with the following qualification.
In the event that, upon the registration of the Negro students
in June, it should appear that economic or other pressure, overtly,
or covertly, is brought to bear on the Negro parents and students,
this Court, having retained jurisdiction, might find it necessary
to eliminate the choice provision from the plan in order to
effectuate the mandate of the Supreme Court in the Brown de-
cisions.56
Should the risk of economic coercion be borne, even temporarily,
by Negro parents ?57  Assuming it should, who has the burden of
" In the Powhatan, Virginia, desegregation case when suit was about to
be filed:
"[D]iscouraging rumors were spread in the Negro community raising
fears that by pressing for their altogether valid rights they [Negro parents]
would bring about a shutdown in the county schools. Repeatedly cited as
a warning example was the experience of adjacent Prince Edward County
where the School Board closed the public schools four years ago and kept
them closed rather than abandon the segregated system. If the record fails
t6 establish that the school officials themselves do not actively propagate such
fears, it plainly shows that they said and did nothing to allay the appre-
hensions which pervaded their community." Bell v. School Bd., Civil No.
8944, 4th Cir., June 29, 1963.
:'Vick v. County School Bd., 205 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tenn. 1962).
'Id. at 440. Compare Kelley v. Board of Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 229 (6th
Cir. 1959), stating:
"If the child is free to attend an integrated school, and his parents vol-
untarily choose a school where only one race attends, he is not being de-
prived of his constitutional rights. It is conceivable that the parent may
have made the choice from a variety of reasons--concern that his child
might otherwise not be treated in a kindly way; personal fear of some
kind of economic reprisal; or a feeling that the child's life will be more
harmonious with members of his own race. In common justice, the choice
should be a free choice, uninfluenced by fear of misery, physical or economic,
or by anxieties on the part of a child or his parents."
In the Knoxville desegregation scheme, Negro students wanting to trans-
fer to all-white schools for special training had to receive the approval of
both the sending and the receiving school. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, on their face, these provisions offered "too much oppor-
tunity for a transfer to be stopped." Goss v. Board of Educ., 305 F.2d 523.
526 (6th Cir. 1962).
"' While the Birmingham, Ala., desegregation suit was pending, the super-
intendent of schools raised the school band and school material fees in the
Negro schools to a par with those of the white schools. In the past the
school system had recognized that Negro parents as a class were more
19631
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proving the existence of economic coercion in a subsequent court
proceeding ?1 And, pragmatically, how many "economically sub-
servient" Negro parents will be willing to testify to covert economic
pressure? If the economic threat could prevent them from en-
rolling their children in white schools in the first place, doesn't it also
prevent them from testifying to this fact?
The power structure within the rural Negro community does not
encourage desegregation. Often Negro political leaders receive
sinecures related to, and dependent upon, the operation of the
Negro schools. Indeed, a survey of rural desegregation in Delaware
reported one Negro leader as being the school bus driver, janitor,
and the landlord of the two school teachers. Again, mass transfers
of Negro students to white schools would indicate a loss of in-
fluence and control by the Negro power structure which is attuned
to the wishes of the white establishment, threatening the continued
sufferance of white politicians to Negro incumbents. At any rate it
would appear that leaders in the rural Negro communities, on bal-
ance, would prefer the dual system of schools, one for Negroes and
one for whites.
With few exceptions59 Negro teachers in rural areas actively
discourage integration, or are non-committal. The reason is simple.
Integration will probably mean their jobs. In a free-choice-of-
schools plan these teachers may be expected to encourage Negro
children to "stay with their own kind." If a substantial number
of Negro children chose to attend the white schools, the white schools
would be integrated. The reason for the Negro school, apartheid
would be frustrated. Consequently, continued operation of the
Negro school would fall to economic considerations, viz., would the
closing of the Negro school and the transfer of the students to the
white schools save the system a large amount of money? The
answer is yes for most systems. 0 Duplicate physical facilities and
economically deprived than white parents in Birmingham. The super-
intendent commented: "I'm striving to equalize everything, in all aspects,
that I can." Birmingham News, Aug. 20, 1962, p. 23.
11 Compare Calhoun v. Latimer, 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 502 (5th Cir. June
17, 1963), with Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962).
" In Delaware, one Negro school principal offered a money incentive to
the parents of a promising Negro child contingent upon his transfer to an
all-white school. The child was not transferred. Wilmington Morning
News, January 2, 1963, p. 1.
" In Fairfax County, Virginia, the estimated utilization of the Negro
schools was only 74% in the 1962-1963 school year, owing to desegregation
and population changes. Washington Post, March 31, 1963, § B, p. 1.
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bus routes are expensive.6 In systems where the white schools can-
not absorb all of the Negro children the Negro schools remain open
but the vacancies created by transfers to white schools result at least
in the dismissal of some teachers.62
Negro teachers in urban areas are not under these pressures to
encourage the status quo segregation. Negro school age populations
are burgeoning in urban areas, and as the ghettos form and expand
the need for Negro teachers expands.6 Moreover, the placement
of Negro teachers on white faculties, to the extent it has occurred
in the South, has occurred in urban centers. 4 Consequently urban
Negro teachers do not feel the economic urgency to discourage
integration that is felt by their rural colleagues.
C. School Assignment by Geographical Attendance Zones
The alternative to allowing all students a free-choice-of-schools is
to assign each student to a particular school. However, as previ-
ously discussed,6 the pupil placement acts of the various southern
states are not acceptable assignment vehicles, at least for desegrega-
tion.66 But another criterion for pupil assignment has been judicially
Dade County, Florida, on its own motion, placed over 300 Negro students
in formerly all-white schools nearest their homes to avoid the cost of busing
them to all-Negro schools. Four school buses were retired from use. Miami
Herald, Nov. 22, 1962, § C, p. 1.
01 See note 60 supra.
See SOUTHEPN STATES 46-48.
'
5 Examples of the effect of the expansion of Negro ghettos on formerly
all-white schools may be found in Charlotte, N. C., and Broward County, Fla.
The formerly all-white schools are first integrated, and then, as the popula-
tion shifts, they become all-Negro, and the all-white faculties are replaced by
all-Negro faculties (hastening the exit of the remaining white enrollment).
SOUTHERN STATES 89; St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Nov. 14, 1962, § A,
p. 14.
, The Oklahoma State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights reported in June, 1963, that: "[E]mployment opportunities for
Negro educators since 1954 have increased and decreased simultaneously.
In the districts which have not desegregated, employment of Negroes has
been constant; in districts where desegregation has been total, opportunities
for Negroes have almost disappeared; in the larger mixed districts, employ-
ment of Negro personnel has increased sharply in the period since 1954.
OKLAHOMA ADvisoRY COmm. ON CivIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE EXTENT
AND PATTERN OF SEGREGATION IN OKLAHOMA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1963).
05 See notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text.
00 "The Court cannot approve the Tennessee Pupil Placement Law as a
plan for accomplishing desegregation of the schools. This law, as shown on
its face, is not a plan for desegregation nor is desegregation a part of its
subject matter or purpose." Sloan v. Tenth School Dist., 6 RACE REL. L.
REP. 999, 1000 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 22, 1961).
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approved as a means to desegregate schools. It is the geographical
attendance zone theory. 7
Most simply, all the schools in the system are assigned attend-
ance zones which include residential areas nearest to the schools.
In cities, this system of assignment is called the neighborhood school
policy. In urban areas, owing to population densities, an elementary
school may be constructed to serve all the children within walking
distance, viz., in the neighborhood.
The same is true on the secondary level. The city will be di-
vided into districts, and, although they will be much larger than
the elementary school districts, secondary school children will be
assigned to the school nearest their homes.68 In effect the neighbor-
hood school policy is applied to larger neighborhoods.
At first blush the neighborhood school policy appears to be the
best possible solution to the desegregation issue in southern cities.
I t eliminates all reference to race in school assignment. It promotes
the safety of children (more so than the free-choice-of-schools plan,
which allows children to travel any place in the city). White chil-
dren in the attendance zones of the former Negro schools cannot
run away6 9 and, on the other hand, Negro children are locked into
"This Court... condemns the Pupil Placement Act when, with a fanfare
of trumpets, it is hailed as the instrument for carrying out a desegregation
plan while all the time the entire public knows that in fact it is being used
to maintain segregation by allowing a little token desegregation." Bush v.
Orleans Parish School Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962).
6? The concept of a school attendance zone is really only a concept.
When a child may choose to attend one of two schools (as in the Houston
plan, notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text) his "zone" is really the
two schools. Again, in the court approved desegregation plan for Transyl-
vania County, North Carolina, Negro children were permitted to choose
to attend the white schools in the county, or bus to an all-Negro school
in the next county (where they had always been sent). Conley v. Transyl-
vania County School Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 2094, W.D.N.C., March 28,
1962. By such a plan the school "zone" for Negro students extended over
two counties, for white students it spanned only one county, A denial of
equal protection of the laws to white students?
"An exception to this grouping would be the special trade schools, or
schools enrolling the very talented academics. These schools generally
enroll students from anywhere in the city.
" Southern school districts which adopted the geographical attendance
zone scheme to desegregate did have a safety valve for this situation. It
was the minority transfer rule, allowing any child whose race is in a
minority in a school to transfer out of the school. The Supreme Court in
Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) declared this provision un-
constitutional. School authorities then proceeded to adopt an open transfer
clause, allowing any child to transfer anywhere where classroom space is
available. See Memphis Commercial Appeal, June 15, 1963, p. 17.
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formerly all white schools.70
Several factors counter the desegregation advantages of the
neighborhood school policy. The plan does lock Negro children
living in the ghettos of southern cities into Negro schools. 1 More-
over, as the population increases in the ghetto, new schools will be
placed there, proliferating the Negro neighborhood schools. 2
Another question is whether the dual system of segregation can
be converted into a unitary system of geographical attendance zones.
Often the traditional Negro schools and white schools are next door
to each other. Regularly shaped attendance zone lines could not
be drawn around these schools. At best two half circles could be
drawn, with the flat sides of the half circles running parallel between
the schools.7"
As an alternative (on the elementary level) the so-called Prince-
ton plan 4 may be used. This plan would use one large attendance
area (a circle instead of the two half circles) to assign pupils in
grades one through three to one of the adjacent schools. The same
attendance area would be used to assign pupils in grades four through
six to the other school.
The Princeton plan cannot be used as easily on the secondary
level if the traditionally all white and the traditionally all Negro
high schools (grades 7-12) adjoin one another. The special facili-
ties and equipment indigenous to grades 7-9 and 10-12 must be
moved into the school serving those grades, in many cases a very
costly transition.
A plan which would bring about the optimum desegregation in a
city saddled with the skeleton of the dual school system would be
"0 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had held the minority trans-
fer rule constitutional, did so out of concern for the isolated Negro child
assigned to an overwhelmingly white school. Kelley v. Board of Educ., 270
F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959).
"1 Residential patterns in southern cities are not as uniracial as those
in northern urban areas, owing to the traditional roles of Negroes as
servants. Negroes lived in carriage-houses and their likes, behind the "big
house." Through the years many Negro families inherited or purchased their
ancestors' quarters and land amid, but not a part of, the white residenlial
areas.
72 See SOUTHERN STATEs 183-84. But see Kreger v. Board of Trustees,
368 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
"' As regards who has the burden of proving an absence of gerrymander
in the formulation of school attendance area zones, compare Dowell v.
School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963), with Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., Civil No. 3630, E.D. La., May 17, 1963.
"' So called because of its early use in Princeton, N.J.
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to employ a Princeton plan in its elementary schools, and then use a
feeder system whereby each elementary school feeds a certain high
school. In a system with two pairs of elementary schools and one
pair of high schools (figure a.), each year each high school would
receive the combined sixth grade enrollment of one formerly all-
Negro, and one formerly all-white, elementary school (figure b.).
Assuming stable residential patterns the system would be desegre-
gated in six years..
P1-6
Figure A 7-120 \ , 7-12
1-6
[ Negro School
Population
White School
Population
14-6E
\\.. 1-3
Figure B 
1-3
1-3 \
As regards rural school systems, school assignment by geograph-
ical attendance areas is more a concept than a reality. Proximity
to school in rural areas is a matter of road conditions, and not mere
distance. Moreover, residential patterns in rural areas are as racially
heterogeneous as any place in the country. Consequently, desegrega-
tion here is simply a matter of revising existing school bus policies.
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If school buses were required to pick up the first thirty odd children
on their route, most rural schools would be desegregated.
V. TEACHER DESEGREGATION
Pupil desegregation in the South has moved with glacial speed. 5
Teacher integration has not moved at all."0
The Negro school teacher teaches solely in the Negro school in
the South for many reasons, not the least of which are personal.
A product of a life of southern apartheid, the Negro teacher, in the
main, does not want to leave the comfort and associations of the
Negro school. He does not want to trade it for the isolation and
other stresses which would arise if he were to take a post in a white
school. Evangelical drive is hard to muster when your job is at
stake.?
Negro teachers do not try to secure their rights by court action
in the South. Rather, teacher desegregation has been made a part
of the demands of Negro students for an education purged of dis-
crimination. Their argument runs as follows: (1) Negro students
have a constitutional right to a racially uninfluenced education; (2)
if teachers are assigned schools and classrooms on a racial basis, all
students in the school system have their education processes affected
by racial considerations; (3) therefore, racially based teacher as-
signment practices affect the constitutional rights of the students,
over and above the affects on the constitutional rights of the teachers.
How have the federal courts treated the issue of teacher de-
segregation? In a phrase, they haven't. The Federal courts have
refused to face the problem until the "desegregation of pupils has
either been accomplished or has made substantial progress."78  In
" By August 1, 1963, nine southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia)
had placed less than 1% of their Negro students with white children.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHITs, REPORT, CIVIL RIGHTS '63, at 65 (1963).
"' By August 1, 1963, no Negro teacher taught on the same faculty with
white teachers. The Chattanooga school system, as a defense to a teacher
discrimination complaint, introduced evidence that a Negro teacher was
teaching by television in the white schools. The court did not consider
this important. Mapp v. Board of Educ., 319 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1963).
"' Several Kentucky school districts, when faced with a desegregation
threat, simply closed the Negro school, fired the Negro teachers, and ab-
sorbed the Negro children in the existing white schools. Since then the Ken-
tucky Attorney General has held the school tenure laws applicable to Negro
teachers, thus, at least officially, condemning the practice. 62 OPs. Ky.
A7T'y GEN. 855 (1962).
"' Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 306 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir.
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the few instances where the courts have decided the issue, the de-
cision has been in the favor of the Negro students." In probably
the nicest distinction in desegregation dogma, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Negro children could complain of the
racial discrimination practiced against teachers and principals. On
the other hand they could not complain of racial discrimination prac-
ticed by the school board against maintenance personnel, central
administrative personnel, and other personnel who were not a daily
part of the education processes directly affecting the Negro stu-
dents.s
Assuming that the desegregation of teachers and pupils cannot
be carried on at the same time, the courts are probably correct in
giving precedence to student desegregation. Certainly if the stu-
dents are the plaintiffs in these suits, they should be afforded their
principal relief first. On the other side of the coin, if a Negro
teacher brought suit for himself, could the federal court subordinate
his constitutional rights to those of another group, the Negro stu-
dents ?81
VI. CONCLUSION
In a local context, but with regional significance, Judge Bailey
Brown hit the issue of southern school desegregation.
The matter is now simple: Does Birmingham have a segre-
gated system? If-and there is really no if-that is so, then
the question is: What is being done to eradicate it? We have
now made it plain by cases which are an affectation to cite that
a plan of desegregation must be offered or the district court
must fashion its own plan.
1962), followed with blithe literality in Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd.,
Civil No. 3630, E.D. La., May 17, 1963.
"' Two decisions in Florida enjoined school boards from assigning all
school personnel on the basis of race. Braxton v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
7 RAcE REL. L. REP. 675 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1962); Tillman v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 7 RAcE RaL. L. REP. 687 (S.D. Fla. Aug 21, 1962). The
injunctions were suspended when the school authorities submitted gradual
plans for pupil desegregation, with teacher desegregation left to future con-
sideration. But see Walker v. Richmond, Ky., Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 241,
E.D. Ky., June 14, 1963, where the court insisted that the school desegrega-
tion plan "provide that no teachers or other personnel of the public schools
of Richmond, Kentucky, shall be employed, assigned, denied employment or
denied assignment on the basis of race or color."
8 Mapp v. Board of Educ., 319 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1963).
"1 Of course, in grade-a-year plans, some Negro students must wait eleven
years to receive an education on a constitutionally valid level, and some Negro
students never do, see note 27 supra.
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Here it is 1962. This is eight years after the warning to
commence with deliberate speed. More than that, the case about
to be heard to consider non-existent defenses will not take place
until October. That means that for yet another year Birmingham
has put off the "evil" day, for by the time the case is heard,
argued, briefed and submitted the opening of the Fall term will
have passed and it will be too late administratively to accommo-
date the school system to the constitution . 2
As the issue becomes clearer, it also becomes clearer that the
resources of Negro citizens, both personal and pecuniary, are being
drained. Can Negro parents look to state and local officers, rather
than themselves, to secure the constitutional rights of Negro school
children? If they cannot, then states rights may perish by holding
its breath.8
"' Nelson v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1962) (concurring
opinion).88 "Recommendation 1.-That the Congress enact legislation requiring
every local school board which maintains any public school to which pupils
are assigned, reassigned, or transferred on the basis of race, to adopt and
publish within 90 days after the enactment of such legislation a plan for
prompt compliance with the constitutional duty to provide nonsegregated
public education for all school-age children within its jurisdiction. The
Congress should authorize the Attorney General, in the event the board fails
to adopt or to implement a plan, to institute legal action to require the
adoption or implementation of such a plan or any such other plan the court
finds more appropriate and consistent with the equal protection clause of the
14th amendment." CIVIL RIGHTS '63, op. cit. supra note 75, at 69.
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